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Abstract
The literature holds a great deal of research in the intrusion detection area.
Much of this describes the design and implementation of specific intrusion
detection systems. While the main focus has been the study of different de-
tection algorithms and methods, there are a number of other issues that are of
equal importance to make these systems function well in practice. I believe
that the reason that the commercial market does not use many of the ideas
described is that there are still too many unresolved issues.
This survey focuses on presenting the different issues that must be ad-
dressed to build fully functional and practically usable intrusion detection
systems (IDSs). It points out the state of the art in each area and suggests
important open research issues.
1 Introduction
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is an ad hoc security solution to protect
flawed computer systems. It works like a burglar alarm that goes off if someone
tampers with or manages to get past other security mechanisms such as authen-
tication mechanisms and firewalls.
The major tasks of an IDS are to collect data from a computer system, analyse
these data to find security relevant events, and present the results to the admin-
istrator. More or less automatic response mechanisms may also be built into the
system.
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Intrusion detection has been discussed in public research since the beginning
of the 1980s. In the 1990s, intrusion detection became a “hot topic” and commer-
cial IDSs started to emerge. A number of research prototypes exist, some of which
have evolved into commercial products. The algorithms and methods used in the
research prototypes are generally much more advanced than what is used in the
commercial systems. For different reasons, the research ideas are often not con-
sidered efficient enough for the commercial market. By concentrating research on
the critical issues, our research results may reach a wider audience.
This survey focuses on research in the area as a whole. It does not survey the
characteristics of IDSs but instead focuses on research and tries to identify how far
we have come in the different areas connected to intrusion detection (state of the
art). It especially examines work done in the areas indicated to be open research
questions by other authors, e.g. Axelsson [Axe98]. The aim is also to point out
where research efforts are needed to carry the area forward. Papers that focus
on a special issue and treat it thoroughly will be given the greatest attention in
this survey. It is not intended to be exhaustive, and there are inevitably research
papers that are not mentioned although they would be well worth bringing up.
The report is organised as follows. Previous surveys, i.e. other surveys and
taxonomies in the intrusion detection area, are described in section 4. Each of
the research areas in figure 2 are presented in depth in section 5. There is an
introduction to each area, a list of research issues within that area, a presentation
of the most interesting papers in the area and a discussion of the status of the
area and what are still the pertinent open research issues. Section 6 discusses and
points out some trends in the research surveyed. Some conclusions are given in
section 7.
2 Outline of generic IDS
Figure 1 shows the components of a general IDS.
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Figure 1: IDS components
The target system has mechanisms to collect various types of data, such as net-
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work traffic, operating system logs and application logs. The event generator takes
care of the logged information and may also collect data itself. Some preprocess-
ing can be done in this component, for example to transform data to a common
format and to make a rough filtering of the data. Often, a log data storage com-
ponent is used to deposit data before it is sent to the analysis engine. This storage
can also be used for the investigation of alarms, and perhaps also for forensics in
a trial.
The analysis engine implements the detection algorithm. A simple detection
method is to use scripts to match text strings that are unique to different intru-
sions. Other types of pattern matching techniques are also possible. This is sim-
ilar to how most anti-virus systems work today and requires a database of “sig-
natures” of all known malicious events we wish to detect. Thresholds for certain
types of events may also be used. Signatures can consist either of a single event
or of a sequence of events. Expert systems can be used to implement advanced
forms of signature detection. What these methods have in common is that they
are preprogrammed to detect events that are considered intrusive.
Another way to perform detection is to make the detection system distinguish
between “normal” behaviour and “anomalous” behaviour in the target system.
Here we create behaviour profiles for programs or users in the system and classi-
fy everything that deviate from the profiles as possibly intrusive. This can be done
using simple statistics or using “intelligent” methods, such as neural networks,
data mining techniques, genetic programming, and visualisation. Often, these
techniques are self-learning and will update the profiles automatically. Some
of these intelligent techniques can also be trained to detect known intrusive be-
haviour. The analysis engine may combine several detection methods to achieve
a more effective detection.
The detection policy component contains preprogrammed information about
how to detect intrusions. Here is where the intrusion signatures and thresholds
are stored. Configuration information for anomaly detection and rules for what
information to send to the response unit are also stored here. The state informa-
tion database contains dynamic information used for detection. This may be state
information about partially fulfilled intrusion signatures and about current be-
haviour in the system.
Information about events that are classified as intrusive or anomalous by the
analysis engine are sent to the response unit. With the guidance of the prepro-
grammed rules in the response policy database, it is decided how to respond to
different events. The decision may be affected by parameters such as the certain-
ty connected to the event and the potential impact of the event. In a distributed
system, the response unit may get input from several analysis engines and must
thus also correlate alarms. The possible response actions are to notify the admin-
istrator, to automatically reconfigure the target system to shut the intruder out, or
to provide response mechanisms to support manual response. Another response
option would be to let the IDS change the data collection configuration or the
detection policy to collect more information about an event in progress.
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3 Intrusion detection research areas
I have identified a number of research issues in the intrusion detection area. These
are shown in figure 2. As we can see here, developing intrusion detection systems
is not only about finding a suitable detection algorithm but also about deciding
what data to collect, how to adapt the IDS to the resources of the target system,
how to test the IDS, and so on. Research results in each of these areas are neces-
sary to build usable and well functioning intrusion detection systems.
IDS environment
and architecture
Intrusion Detection
Detection
methods
IDS
Security
evaluation
collection
Response
Social
Data
aspects
Testing and
Operational
aspects
Foundations
Figure 2: Intrusion detection research areas
The areas shown in the figure are issues addressed in the existing research.
Some of the areas are mentioned in particular as open research questions. The
components mentioned in standardisation efforts in the intrusion detection area
are included as separate issues.
The following is a short description of each of these areas.
  Foundations: This is the fundamental work in the area. We need to find
out what types of intrusions and what types of intruders we want to defend
ourselves against in order to be able to build an effective defence. Here we
study intrusions, intruders, and vulnerabilities.
  Data collection: This area is about defining what data to collect as input to
the detection system. The main questions here are how to collect the data,
what logging mechanisms to use, where to store the data, and the points in
the system at which the data should be collected.
  Detection methods: The detection method is the kernel of the detection
system. Here we want to find the best algorithms to distinguish between
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normal and fraudulent behaviour for different situations and different input
data. It may also include research on how to combine or improve methods
to achieve more effective and efficient detection.
  Reporting and response: When the detection algorithm has indicated that
a certain event or series of events are intrusive, we must bring this to the
attention of the system administrator or the person responsible for security.
This area deals with finding the best way to present alarms and to respond
to alarms. Research issues here may include designing advanced graphi-
cal user interfaces to support manual response, creating an active response
toolkit, or defining limitations for automatic response.
  IDS environment and architecture: Most computer systems today form
more or less complex networks. It is not obvious how to distribute the IDS
components in the system to achieve effective detection. Furthermore, com-
puter systems today are often heterogeneous, which adds extra complexity
when the IDS must collect data from computers running different operat-
ing systems etc. Another research issue here is the question of how to detect
intrusions when other security mechanisms form obstacles, such as when
network links are encrypted.
  IDS security: IDS security deals with how to protect the different compo-
nents of the IDS against a direct attack. Data collection and storage must be
protected and it must be possible to verify them. The detection and response
units must also be functional under an attack and it must not possible to de-
ceive them.
  Testing and evaluation: This area has to do with finding methods to com-
pare and evaluate intrusion detection systems. This has proved to be a dif-
ficult task. Some of the issues here are how to create test data with the
right properties, finding out what properties to measure, and defining what
properties are important for different types of target systems.
  Operational aspects: Operational aspects are the technical issues important
to customers using IDSs. They include for example maintenance, portabil-
ity and upgradability. Issues such as interoperability between IDSs or IDS
components are also important.
  Social aspects: The last area discussed in this report is the social aspects of
deploying IDSs. Some ethical and legal issues may hinder the spreading of
IDSs. The main issues that have been discussed so far in public research are
privacy issues and questions about how to make the output of IDSs usable
as forensics.
Each of these areas is described in depth in section 5. Some interesting re-
search issues in each area are suggested, and the existing research in these issues
is summarised and briefly discussed.
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4 Previous surveys
During the period of time since intrusion detection became a familiar concept, a
number of surveys and taxonomies of intrusion detection systems and research
have emerged. Most of them survey existing IDSs and IDS characteristics, espe-
cially the detection techniques used. Many also mention open research issues and
trends in the area. However, none has a broader focus on all the research issues
in the area or presents them in a structured way.
4.1 Surveys
The first intrusion detection survey to my knowledge, was published by Lunt
[Lun88]. It gives an overview of automated audit trail analysis techniques and
intrusion detection systems at that time. It describes work done at Sytek and
SRI, two of the first places to focus on intrusion detection research. Sytek used
mainly pattern recognition techniques. They identified features that performed
well (low false-alarm rate) for user statistics, file statistics, and process statistics.
SRI used statistical techniques to create behaviour profiles for users and detected
deviations from these profiles. The IDSs surveyed in this paper are e.g. IDES,
MIDAS, NAURS, Keystroke Dynamics, and Discovery. These are probably the
major part of the IDSs that existed at that time.
McAuliffe et al. [MWS
 
90] published a survey of the same type as Lunt’s. It
came out in 1990 and thus added a number of new IDSs to the survey. It also
includes a discussion of the importance of the interaction with the SSO (Site Se-
curity Officer) and describes the user interface of the surveyed systems in some
detail. The IDSs described in this paper are Haystack, ComputerWatch, ISOA,
NSM, NADIR, and W&S.
Mukherjee, Heberlein and Lewitt [MHL94] surveyed host-based and network-
based intrusion detection systems. The first class covers ComputerWatch, Discov-
ery, Haystack, IDES, ISOA, MIDAS, and W&S. The second class includes NADIR,
NSM, and DIDS. An overview is presented for each system and system organi-
sation and operation are described. It mentions, but does not discuss, some open
research issues. These are benchmarking, representation of attacks and misuse,
more effective detection strategies, detection in arbitrarily large networks, and
how to protect the IDS itself from attacks.
Another paper that attempts to survey current (1995) approaches to intrusion
detection is [ESNP95]. It discusses network vs stand-alone and batch vs real-time
analysis. The main part of the paper surveys detection methods and mentions
different IDSs in this context. A great deal has happened in the intrusion detection
area since this paper was written. It mentions, but does not discuss, the following
future research issues.
  Testing IDS and measuring its effectiveness
  Detecting intruders in distributed systems
  Determining the most appropriate technologies to use in specific situations
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  Examining computer user acceptance of intrusion detection (privacy issues)
Kumar’s PhD thesis [Kum95] includes a detailed overview of detection meth-
ods and gives a great deal of references to papers reporting the different methods.
A number of shortcomings in current (1995) intrusion detection research are pre-
sented. These are:
  No generic building method (substantial effort necessary to build IDS from
scratch)
  Efficiency
  Portability
  Upgradability
  Maintenance
  Performance and coverage benchmarks
  No good testing method
4.2 Taxonomies
Later surveys all include taxonomies, which are used to classify the systems sur-
veyed.
The paper by Debar et al. [DDW99] describes a taxonomy of IDS characteris-
tics. The taxonomy focuses on four areas: detection method, behaviour on detec-
tion, audit source location, and usage frequency. They categorise contemporary
IDSs using their taxonomy. Open research issues mentioned in this paper are:
  Efficiency of network and host audit sources
  Content and format of the audit trail
  New approaches to analysis for more effective detection
  Detection of insiders (abuse-of-privilege attacks)
One of the newer and more up-to-date surveys is by Axelsson [Axe98], which
focuses on surveying intrusion detection systems. It includes a taxonomy of in-
teresting IDS properties and classifies a large number of both commercial systems
and research prototypes according to this taxonomy. It further discusses trends
and yet to be resolved issues. The following open research questions are pointed
out and thoroughly discussed.
  Active response
  How to collect, store, and prune the vast amounts of audit data
  Coverage. Lack of study of the nature of the intrusions the systems should
be able to classify
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  How, and how much, to report to the SSO (Site Security Officer)
  How to deal with attacks against the IDS itself
The most recent intrusion detection taxonomy I have found is [ACD
 
01]. The
aim here is to create a more fine-grained classification scheme for IDSs. They
describe IDSs by formalising their characteristics, but they limit their model of an
intrusion detection system to consist of only the intrusion detection engine and the
sensor/information source. The taxonomy describes the capabilities of an IDS and
provides a framework for evaluating IDSs and determining whether a given IDS
has the potential of detecting a given attack or whether it generates false alarms.
As far as I know, they have not validated this taxonomy yet by evaluating IDSs.
4.3 Open research issues and trends
Below is a collection of the open research issues mentioned and/or discussed in
the other surveys and taxonomies mentioned above.
Foundations
  A generic building method (substantial effort is required to build IDS from
scratch)
  Representation of attacks and misuse
  Coverage. Study of the nature of the intrusions the systems should be able
to classify
Response
  How, and how much, to report to the SSO (Site Security Officer)
IDS architecture and environment
  Detecting intruders in distributed systems
Testing and evaluation
  Testing IDS and measuring its effectiveness
Security
  How to deal with attacks against the IDS itself
Social aspects
  Examining the computer user acceptance of intrusion detection (privacy is-
sues)
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Operational aspects
  Portability
  Upgradability
  Maintenance
Some trends pointed out are that, in the middle of the 1990s, many of the IDSs
went from being host-based to network-based while, at the end of the 1990s, the
interest had turned back to host-based IDSs. Further, many of the first IDSs were
not intended to run in a real-time environment. In recent years, most of them do.
Another trend is that the interest in anomaly-based detection fell in the second
half of the 1990s, but seems to be returning in recent research.
4.4 Commercial surveys
A number of surveys of commercial IDSs has been made. In general, they are
not of great interest in this paper, since they do not give much information on the
technical details and do not really reach state of the art within the research. Some
reports are more thorough, however, and may be interesting from a research per-
spective.
One of these surveys of commercial systems is [Kva99]. This paper gives a
number of comparison criteria. These include granularity of data processing,
source of audit data, detection method, response to detected intrusions, system
organisation, security, degree of interoperability, manageability, adaptivity, and
system and network infrastructure requirements. These criteria have been de-
rived from the classification by Axelsson [Axe98]. 17 IDS products were reviewed
and evaluated according to each of the comparison criteria.
Another rather interesting survey of commercial systems is [Jac99]. She iden-
tifies a number of important IDS properties. Among the characteristics are de-
ployment, information source, detection method, execution, and response. Other
attributes discussed are suitability, flexibility, protection, interoperability, com-
prehensiveness, event management, active response, acquisition, and support. A
number of commercial products are described according to these characteristics
and attributes. She also surveys 17 IDS products, whereof 12 are the same as in
[Kva99].
These two surveys give a good overview of available IDSs and their proper-
ties. The information in these two surveys is comparable, and the trends seem
to point in the same direction. Some trends that can be spotted in these surveys
are that more systems are network-based than host-based, and that most systems
only use network packets as the information source. Other trends are that all
systems use knowledge-based detection, i.e. looking for patterns of known mis-
use, while only a few systems use some form of behaviour-based detection, and
all systems except one have real-time processing. Also, more than half of the
systems have some form of active response. Some systems have protection mech-
anisms against attacks directed towards themselves, but the security of the IDSs
is generally rather low.
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5 Research areas
Research in each of the areas named in section 3 is reviewed here. The area that
has received the most attention so far is the foundations and detection method. Ar-
eas currently considered hot include testing and evaluation and response. Future
research will probably be more in IDS environment and architecture and hopefully
also in data collection.
5.1 Foundations
This is research on the foundations of the area, which has to do both with defi-
nitions and terminology as well as studies and taxonomies of attackers, vulner-
abilities and intrusions. We need to know the threat, i.e. study attackers, their
objectives and methods, to know what kind of attacks we can expect and whom
we need to defend ourselves against. The areas of “data collection” and “detec-
tion method” are heavily dependent on this research. A suitable taxonomy of
intrusions may be very helpful in deciding what data to collect to efficiently trace
intrusions within a specific class. A description of the intrusion technique or vul-
nerability exploited for a collection of attacks makes it possible to design intrusion
signatures to detect each of them. Another taxonomy may help in deciding what
detection method would be most effective for a specific class of intrusions. A
third type of taxonomy may help in deciding what classes of intrusions are most
likely to appear or are most important to set up a defence against in a specific
type of computer system. Risk and cost analysis are also interesting since they
motivate the use of IDSs.
5.1.1 Study of attackers
Jonsson and Olovsson [JO97] studied the intrusion process by letting students
(unexperienced in the field of cracking) attack a computer system. They mea-
sured the time to the first security breach for each attacker and had a mean value
of four hours in their case. They see the attack session as a process in which
the attacker first goes through learning phase, then starts making many standard
(widely known) attacks, and finally comes into an innovative attack phase where
the intrusions are fewer but typically novel.
There are also studies of the means and motives of attackers. Denning has
written several papers about hackers, their motives and their own view of what
they are doing, e.g. [Den90].
5.1.2 Vulnerability analysis and categorisation
Landwehr [LBMC94] presents a taxonomy of computer program security flaws,
and a number of flaws in different computing environments have been classified
according to his taxonomy. Three dimensions are used to classify the flaws. The
first one is genesis (how did the flaw enter the system?), the second is time of
introduction (when did the flaw enter the system?) and the last is location (where
in the system is it manifested?).
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Krsul [Krs98] made a thorough analysis of software vulnerabilities in his the-
sis. He collected a database of vulnerabilities and presents a framework for de-
veloping taxonomies for software vulnerabilities. He suggests a large number of
features that can be used to classify vulnerabilities that he divides into classes, e.g.
threat features, environmental assumption features, objects affected, and effect on
objects. He also discusses classification theory and points out the weaknesses of
other classification schemes and taxonomies. However, the main focus of this
work is to make it possible to study and understand the nature of software vul-
nerabilities. This would especially help to improve the design and development
of software. The aim is not to make the taxonomy directly useful for intrusion
detection, even though it may be possible to create detection patterns from the
information collected about the vulnerabilities.
5.1.3 Intrusion categorisation
Lindqvist and Jonsson [LJ97] present a survey of work in intrusion classifica-
tion and a new scheme for intrusion classification. The aim of this classification
scheme is to be useful in incident reporting and to present intrusions to a sys-
tem owner in a helpful way. The focus is on external observations about the
attacks, unlike Landwehr’s approach which requires information about the soft-
ware development process. The two chief dimensions used in this classification
are intrusion technique and intrusion result. The intrusion technique category with
subcategories is an extension of the taxonomy in [NP89].
Howard [How97] investigated several thousand incidents reported to the CERT
Coordination Center and presented a great deal of statistics about these incidents.
He also introduces a taxonomy for classification of the incidents, which views an
attack as a process, as below.
Attackers    tools    access    results    Objectives
This taxonomy has the same focus as that of Lindqvist and Jonsson [LJ97] but
includes some additional steps in the process. The intrusion technique in [LJ97]
approximately corresponds to tools and access, and intrusion result corresponds
directly to results.
The database of incidents used here is not publicly available. This informa-
tion would be of great help to people developing or doing research on intrusion
detection tools.
Kendall [Ken99] collected a large database of intrusions that have been used
in the DARPA intrusion detection evaluation [DAR01]. They were collected from
publicly available sources, such as Rootshell, the Bugtraq mailing list, CERT, ISS
X-force, and vendor-initiated bulletins. Some new exploits were created especial-
ly for this evaluation. He also developed a taxonomy for these intrusions. The
main dimension of this classification scheme is the transitions between privilege
levels. Other dimensions are the method of transition or exploitation and action. The
four main groups of attacks used in the DARPA evaluation are Denial of Service,
Remote to User, User to Superuser, and Surveillance/Probing. It is not actually ex-
plained why these four categories are used to present the attacks or why they are
particulary useful for intrusion injection.
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5.1.4 Intrusion categorisation based on complexity of matching
Kumar [Kum95] presents a scheme to classify intrusion patterns on the basis of
the complexity of matching. This scheme has four categories. The first is existence
patterns, i.e. the fact that something exists is sufficient for detecting the intrusion
attempt. Examples may be the existence of specific permissions on special files,
presence of certain files, and format and content of files. This type of pattern looks
for evidence left by an intruder. It can especially be used to detect configuration
mistakes. The time required to match a pattern of this type is constant and not
dependent on the history of events.
The second category is sequence patterns. This type of pattern can be used to
specify intrusions that are characterised by a strict sequence of events. There
are two special cases of this category. The first is interval, where the matching
requires that two events happen within a special interval apart. The second is
duration, where events must not exist or happen for more than or less than a cer-
tain interval of time. For example, race condition attacks can be represented by
sequence patterns. The time to process an event for sequence patterns depends
on the events in the event stream that occurred before the event.
The third category is RE patterns, i.e. extended regular expressions including
the primitive AND to construct patterns. This type of pattern can represent in-
trusions that include a number of activities done jointly but in an arbitrary order.
This category is a superset of sequence patterns.
The fourth category is other patterns. This category contains all intrusion sig-
natures that can not be represented by one of the earlier categories. Patterns that
fall into this category include those that require matching negations of the type
“not followed by” and patterns using selection of the type “x-3 out of x conditions
must be satisfied to match”.
These categories form a hierarchy, where category three is a subset of catego-
ry four, category two is a subset of category three, and category one is a subset
of category two. In another project they studied intrusions and created intrusion
signatures with which they populated the hierarchy. They claim that most intru-
sions they have studied fall into the first three categories and state that different
approaches to detection can be used for the different categories.
This may be the most useful approach to a categorisation of intrusions for
purposes of intrusion detection, and perhaps the only published material that
truly focuses on creating a classification scheme with intrusion detection in mind.
5.1.5 Intrusion categorisation based on criteria relevant to the intrusion detec-
tion process
Alessandri et al. [ACD
 
01] presents an “activity” taxonomy, which is validated
by classifying 358 attacks from IBM’s vulnerability database, VulDa. An activi-
ty can be described as an event or sequence of events that are relevant to IDSs.
The goal of this taxonomy is to allow a description of activities based on criteria
relevant to the intrusion detection process conducted by IDSs. It should also be
possible to describe activities that are similar to other activities that threaten or
violate the security policy, i.e. activities that may cause false alarms. The criteria
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used in this taxonomy are directly relevant to how IDSs analyse input data to de-
tect attacks. The taxonomy is ment to be used when evaluating IDSs in order to
support the choice of suitable “activities” from different classes.
The two main classes of this taxonomy are static and dynamic activity charac-
teristics. Subclasses to static characteristics are affected object, e.g. memory, oper-
ating system core, or network stack, and interface object, e.g. system call, socket,
or network layer. Subclasses to dynamic characteristics are communication, method
invocation, and additional attributes.
5.1.6 Discussion and conclusions
The following issues have been studied or would be interesting to study to form
a complete picture of the foundations of the intrusion detection area.
  Study of attackers
  Vulnerability categorisation
  Intrusion collection
  Intrusion categorisation
  Normal behaviour categorisation
Study of attackers has been done but not very extensively. However, this area
may not have a very large impact on the development of intrusion detection.
A great many vulnerability categorisations exist. These may be of interest for
intrusion detection researchers, even though they are not of direct help in the
development of better IDSs.
Intrusion collection has been done in several projects. The intrusion databases
are often not publicly available, however, which of course makes them less useful.
Public databases with extensive information about intrusions would carry the
intrusion detection research forward.
Intrusion categorisation is more interesting in the development of the intrusion
detection research at this time. It would be of great help to find categorisations of
intrusions that have similar detection properties. An intrusion categorisation can
have many different goals and therefore can be of many types.
Some possible types are:
  Vulnerability exploit
  Intrusion technique
  Result of attack
  Traceability
  Detectability
  Cost
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  Type of system attacked
Although vulnerability exploit, intrusion technique, and result of attack are
very common dimensions of intrusion taxonomies, they may not be the most
interesting characteristics for research in intrusion detection.
Some initial efforts have been made on categorisation based on traceability
and detectability. These are very interesting for the development of the areas of
evaluation and testing and of improving efficiency. They may also be useful in
studying how to combine detection methods. I believe that these areas deserve
more attention.
A cost has been associated with each attack in the area of fraud, e.g. in [SFL
 
00].
The cost parameter is used in the training of the fraud detection system to make
it prioritise costly frauds. I have not yet seen any similar work in the area of
intrusion detection.
I have not seen any studies of the types of attacks (or attackers) that hit differ-
ent types of systems. This may be an interesting issue, since it may help us define
a more accurate and adapted picture of the threat.
A structured approach to normal behaviour categorisation seems not to exist in
intrusion detection research as yet.
5.2 Data collection
The desire is for suitable, high quality input to the IDS. If the quality of the input
data is very good, many other issues will resolve themselves. For example, if the
amount of input data is kept low, the efficiency of the IDS is not as critical. Also, if
we use input data containing exactly the information we need for effective detec-
tion, we will miss fewer intrusions. Data collection is one of the most important
issues in intrusion detection. Even if only manual intrusion detection is used, the
importance of high quality input data is still valid to the same degree.
Data collection has to do with deciding what information to collect, how to
collect it, and when to collect it. The choice of data collection procedures may
be affected by the type of detection algorithm used and the type of system in
which the detection will be done. It is important to study the threat and decide
what type of incidents we wish to detect so that we can properly specify the data
collection procedure. At the same time the resources used for data collection must
be limited.
Key issues are to identify what data sources are most suitable for intrusion
detection and to define a common log format for the data collected. Another
issue is how to reduce the amount of log data from these data sources while still
ensuring enough information for correct detection.
5.2.1 Data sources
Every project on developing or testing intrusion detection systems uses some
kind of data. In most cases, the data used seem to be what is easily available
with the standard logging mechanisms. This may be e.g. network traffic, logged
by the tcpdump tool, system calls logged by the SUN BSM mechanism, or syslog
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logs generated by the OS kernel and various applications, such as ftp and smtp.
If data from different sources are used by the same detection mechanism, they are
in most cases transformed to a common log format.
Many papers do not really focus on data collection but reveal a great deal of
information about the data sources they use.
One is about the network Bro IDS [Pax98]. This author uses a low-level packet-
capture library (libpcap) to collect network traffic. The traffic is used to detect
network attacks, i.e. attacks against the IP and TCP/UDP protocols. This infor-
mation is easy to extract from the network traffic. He also describes how informa-
tion from the finger, ftp, portmapper, and telnet application protocols is extracted.
This is a more demanding task, and he describes a number of problems in parsing
the application-specific information. Some data reduction is also done. Low level
filters decide whether the full packet, only the header, or nothing at all should be
recorded. Packets that are not processed are simply thrown away.
Forrest et al. [FHSL96] used the Sun BSM (Basic Security Module) to collect
system calls. They then used the system calls to establish normal behaviour for
processes in a Unix system. This information was then used for anomaly detec-
tion.
Sun BSM system calls are also used in the EMERALD environment developed
at SRI. Some examples of BSM audit trail analysis are described in [LP99]. They
give examples of expert system rules for detecting failed authentications and for
detecting generic buffer overflow attacks.
In the DARPA intrusion detection evaluation [LFG
 
00], both network traffic
collected by tcpdump and system calls collected by Sun BSM were used.
The log watching tool Swatch [HA93] used syslog files as a source of informa-
tion. They modified some system utilities, such as fingerd, ftpd, and login, to
achieve more extensive reporting. The syslog files are sent to a central logserver,
since it is not secure to store them locally on the machines being monitored.
In [LB98], Unix shell commands are used to create user profiles that are then
used for anomaly detection experiments. They claim that they use this type of
data since tools exist that make it convenient to collect it. However, a problem is
that almost no shell traces of attacks are available, which makes it more difficult
to test the detection mechanism.
5.2.2 Data format
A paper that discusses the importance of a standard audit trail format is [Bis95].
A standard audit trail format is necessary to be able to correlate logs from hetero-
geneous systems and to allow interoperability of audit systems on a large scale.
Bishop suggests an extensible and portable log format, but this format does not
specify at all what information should be logged.
Price [Pri97] covers the subject of operating system audit data collection and
the needs of intrusion detection systems. It includes a survey of systems with ex-
tended auditing capabilities, but she claims that all of the audit trails suggested
are too closely linked to the operating system and do not easily extend to support
other operating systems. It also includes a thorough survey of the information
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that five different misuse detection systems use and a review of the information
are offered by the common operating system audit trails. The requirements and
the information offered are compared to find out whether the information is suf-
ficient. The conclusion is that the offered information is not sufficient to cover the
needs of the misuse detection systems surveyed. This may be the work that thus
far best covers the issue of suitable audit format and content of data for intrusion
detection.
The intrusion detection working group (IDWG) [IDW01] from IETF has the
task of providing a common way of communicating between IDSs. They recent-
ly produced some Internet drafts on a standardised intrusion detection exchange
format. The high-level requirements for sharing information of interest to in-
trusion detection and response systems and the connected management systems
are described in [WE01]. Draft [CD01] defines data formats and exchange pro-
cedures and gives an implementation of the data model in XML. Draft [FMW01]
specifies an application-level protocol for exchanging the IDMEF messages de-
scribed in [CD01]. This protocol supports mutual authentication, confidentiality
and integrity. It remains to be seen whether this format will have impact in the
IDS society.
The CERIAS group at Purdue University started up projects on Audit Trails
Format [Cer98b] and Audit Trail Reduction [Cer98a]. I have not however seen very
much of the results of this work as yet.
5.2.3 Effective/efficient logging
A form of light-weight logging is suggested in [ALGJ98]. Only the exec() system
call, together with its arguments is logged. Data were collected during realistic
intrusion experiments and categorised into ten classes. It was shown that this
form of logging is more effective in detecting the intrusions generated in these
experiments than “traditional” logging. It also consumes less storage space. By
traditional logging we mean the built-in UNIX logging mechanisms that log con-
nect time (who is logged in on the system and when), process accounting by pacct,
and syslog logging from various daemons, user programs, and the kernel. Seven
of the ten classes of intrusions were traceable using the exec() logging, while only
three classes were traceable using the other logging mechanisms. They discuss
the traditional logging mechanisms, point out their disadvantages, and explain
why they did not catch the intrusions in these experiments. This is the only pa-
per, to my knowledge, that actually focuses on creating a more effective and a
more efficient logging suitable for intrusion detection.
Another way to achieve a more efficient logging is to use some form of dy-
namic or adaptive logging.
In, for example, Haystack [Sma88], there is a possibility to flag single user
accounts to collect more information about them. This can be viewed as a form of
adaptive logging.
Paxon [Pax98] suggests dynamic logging as a way of making graceful degra-
dation. His solution is to drop all traffic from certain pre-defined protocols when
the load becomes too high.
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5.2.4 New collection mechanisms
One recent report that may be a result of the CERIAS projects is [SZ00a]. They
draw conclusions about data collection from their experience in work with the
AAFID distributed intrusion detection system. They claim that it is preferable
to make direct data collection and give a number of reasons for this. Direct
data collection means that functions in the operating system and applications
are equipped with collection mechanisms that are adapted to intrusion detection
needs, and this information is not recorded in a file before it is captured by the
IDS. This gives a number of advantages. For example, it is more difficult for the
intruder to modify the information used by the IDS and that only the informa-
tion needed is collected, which makes the data collection more efficient. They
also claim that direct data collection is best implemented with internal sensors,
i.e. the operating system and application code must be modified. They have also
started work on implementing internal sensors in a Unix system.
Other papers from CERIAS are [DS99] and [DS00]. The first of these studies
the information needed to detect low-level network attacks with host-based de-
tection. They state that existing host-based audit trails do not contain the required
information. The second paper describes an implementation of a collection mech-
anism for creating a network audit on a host by modifying the operating system.
5.2.5 Log file security
Schneier and Kelsey [SK99] discuss how to secure logs, since it is important that
the input to the IDS is correct. More detail on this work is given in section 5.6, as
I consider this to be a security issue.
However, the authors also wrote a paper on how to make their log encryption
scheme more efficient in order to make it useful in low-bandwidth environments
[KS99].
5.2.6 Commercial status
Jackson’s survey [Jac99] gives information about information sources used in
commercial IDSs. Most systems use only network packets. A few use operating
system logs, some use specific application logs, e.g. from web servers or firewalls,
and some use file system information.
5.2.7 Discussion and conclusions
The following issues have been studied or would be interesting to study to form
a complete picture of the foundations of the data collection area.
  Data sources - An evaluation of existing data sources and suggestion for
new types of data sources.
  Data format
  Dynamic logging
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  Efficient logging - fast and storage efficient
  Effective logging
  Secure logging
Different data sources have been used, studied and evaluated, and some new
sources have been suggested, but there is room for more work in this area. Most
intrusion detection systems just use the available audit data. Data format has also
been studied, and some standardisation efforts have been made but it is not yet
clear what the content of the logs should be or what they should look like.
Dynamic logging, i.e. adapting the amount of log data and the contents of log
data to the current threat, has been suggested, but, as far as I know, no work
focuses on this issue.
Much more work can be done on both efficient logging and effective logging.
Effective logging is about collecting all data necessary to conduct correct and
reliable detection. Efficient logging has to do with minimising the amount of
data collected and the storage needs. However, people designing new collection
mechanims are aware of these issues and do address the problems to some extent.
While secure logging is an important issue and has been addressed, most re-
search papers on intrusion detection ignore this issue.
A conclusion to be made from this survey of work on data collection is that
this has been neglected in most research presented on intrusion detection but that
interest in the issue seems to be on the rise. Much more research must be done in
the area to achieve high quality data collection suitable for intrusion detection.
A significant problem in the area of data collection is that we often do not
know exactly what intrusions we wish to detect. This means the data collection
may need to be more generic and will not be able to be as limited and efficient as
we would like. Furthermore, if we choose to limit data collection, we always risk
missing intrusions when the attacker finds out how to act in a way that does not
leave “fingerprints”. We are thus dependent on work in the foundations area to
establish better data collection.
5.3 Detection method
Detection method in this context refers to automatic detection. Purely manual
detection and manual output processing goes under the reporting and response
area, even though there may only be a small difference between visualisation and
“simple” reporting. Many different detection methods have been implemented
and tested in the area of detection. Some were mentioned in section 2.
An interesting issue is how to make detection more effective. Many methods
produce a great many false alarms, and this is one of the greatest problems in
intrusion detection today. One approach may be to combine different detection
methods. Certain methods may be more suitable for certain classes of attacks.
Another way to combine detection components may be to use them sequentially,
i.e. to use one method for initial data filtering or reduction and another for the
final filtering before reporting.
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Another issue is how to make detection more efficient. We want to minimise
the computing power and storage space needed. Efficiency may also be about
timely detection, i.e. making the time from the start of the malicious activity until
it is detected as short as possible.
The detection methods can be categorised in many different ways, and sever-
al taxonomies and classifications on detection method have been proposed, e.g.
[DDW99] and [Axe98]. I will use only a rough division into anomaly and misuse
detection, since these are the most commonly used categories. Visualisation may
be considered an anomaly detection approach but, since it is less explored and
may be a promising approach, I treat it as a separate area. Also, since the work on
different anomaly and misuse detection methods has been described thoroughly
in other surveys, I will only make a quick summary of the different approaches.
More effort is put into surveying work on visualisation, how to combine detection
components, and on effective and efficient detection.
5.3.1 Data reduction
Data reduction can be used as preprocessing to detection or to support manual
analysis of the output data. This may be done by filtering log data to capture the
security-relevant events. It may also be useful to reduce data by grouping it into
sessions. ComputerWatch [DR90] is one example of an audit reduction tool.
5.3.2 Misuse detection
Misuse detection is primarily done using some form of pattern matching.
The most simple form of pattern matching is string matching. In Swatch
[HA93], this is done using the well-known regex tool. It is easy for the admin-
istrator to add his own patterns for events he wishes to be notified about.
Expert systems have been used in several IDSs, for example EMERALD [LP99]
and ASAX [Mou97]. The underlying idea is to create a knowledge base by talk-
ing to experts in the area. The rules in the expert system are often in the form of
if-then questions, which are used to derive relevant facts from the log data. It is
possible to create more complex “scenarios” using an expert system than using
simple string matching, and it is probably easier to encode knowlegde about mis-
use. Both these papers include descriptions of special languages that are designed
to make it easier to write pattern matching rules.
Another approach is state transition analysis. This is done in the USTAT tool
[Ilg93]. Intrusions are encoded as a series of transitions between system states,
where the system is first in a secure state and then when the intrusion has been
made, putting the system in an insecure state.
Kumar and Spafford model intrusions using coloured Petri nets in their proto-
type called IDIOT [KS94].
Both state transition analysis and coloured Petri nets require a great deal of
work in constructing the rules. However, they both have positive features.
Data mining is another popular method in intrusion detection. [LSM99] use
data mining to extract useful patterns from network traffic and create intrusion
models. This method is interesting since it automates the creation of detection
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rules somewhat. The authors claim that their rules become more general and
produce fewer false alarms than “hand-coded” rules. Data mining can also be
used for anomaly detection.
5.3.3 Anomaly detection
Anomaly detection can be done in many ways. Statistics, neural networks, and
genetic programming are some of the methods that have been implemented.
The best described statistical anomaly detection component is the one used in
NIDES [JV94]. This is also one of the most advanced anomaly detection systems.
These authors calculate statistics for a large number of parameters in the system.
The parameters are updated daily to adapt to changes in behaviour. Each audit
record that is compared to the profiles is given a score value that represents its
similarity to the profile parameters. A threshold value can be set to report only
those events that have a higher score value.
Neural networks have been used for anomaly detection, for example by [DBS92].
Neural networks are good at classifying input data automatically. A problem is
that suitable data are needed to train the neural network, and it may be difficult
to understand why it classifies an event as anomalous.
Another “artificial intelligent method” used for anomaly detection is genetic
algorithms. As far as I know, it has only been used in the Gassata analysis tool
[Me´98].
Lane and Brodey use instance based learning to create profiles of normal be-
haviour and discuss different ways to make the method more efficient. They also
describe an experiment in which they use their method to create profiles of user
behaviour from Unix shell command data.
Forrest et al. [FHSL96] used system calls to establish normal behaviour for
processes in a Unix system. This is done by creating a database of short sequences
of system calls for each process. It is then possible to carry out anomaly detection,
i.e. to detect deviations from normal behaviour by comparing sequences of sys-
tem calls generated by the running process to the database of normal behaviour.
Most anomaly detection methods are more or less self-learning and can be
trained to recognise normal behaviour. Ko [KRL97] used another approach that
he calls specification-based detection. The intended security-relevant behaviour
of programs is manually specified using a formal method. Deviations from this
specification are then detected. This may be very useful for monitoring security-
critical programs.
5.3.4 Bayesian techniques
Another detection method used in EMERALD is Bayes’ net technology [VS00].
The method is model-based and uses probabilistic reasoning and interference.
They claim that the eBayes detection component using this method combines the
best features of misuse and anomaly detection.
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5.3.5 Visualisation
Girardin [Gir99] presents a new approach to detection. He used an unsupervised
neural network to reduce the dimensions of the input data. A self-organising
map was used to project network events on a space appropriate for visualisation.
The output was visualised in a grid where the units of the map were portrayed
as squares. Squares of different sizes and colours represent the number of events
mapped in the unit and the weight of the selected attribute. This is a recent pa-
per and the first I am aware of that focuses on visualisation for use in intrusion
detection.
Work by Erbacher and Frincke [EF00] aims at visualising intrusion detection
data in a large-scale network of computers. They use an IDS to collect data from
the network and analyse this data to present the communication between the
active nodes (hosts) in the network. Circles represent nodes in the network. Dif-
ferent colours, directions of arrows, line thicknesses etc. represent different pro-
tocols, properties and events.
5.3.6 Combining detection methods and multi-tiered detection
Combining methods may give better coverage, and may make the detection more
effective. The question is what methods to combine and how.
A paper that combines three different methods in one system is [FP96]. This
is a fraud detection system, but the techniques should be applicable to intrusion
detection as well. Data mining is used to find indicators of fraud, constructive
induction is used to create profiling detectors, and an evidence-combining com-
ponent correlates output from the profiling detectors and generates alarms.
Many intrusion detection systems use both anomaly and misuse detection
components, but most reports of them do not give a discussion of how to inte-
grate them.
A way to combine methods is to use several layers of filtering. For example,
it may be very useful to analyse alarms to collect them into scenarios, to remove
redundant alarms, or to get more information about the incident. NIDES and
EMERALD include a component called the resolver that filters the alarms so that
redundant alarms are removed.
Valdes [VS01] suggests an approach to sensor correlation, which means that
alarms from different components in the detection system are analysed and cor-
related at different levels.
Another method that can be used to correlate and draw conclusions from data
from many distributed sources is multisensor data fusion. This method is described
for example in Bass [Bas00].
5.3.7 Effective detection
Axelsson [Axe99] studies the effectiveness of intrusion detection and states that it
may be very difficult to make detection (especially anomaly detection) sufficiently
effective with respect to the false alarm rate.
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On the other hand, many papers using anomaly detection criticise misuse de-
tection for not being effective in terms of coverage . Misuse detection can never
achieve complete coverage because it does not detect “new” intrusions.
A suggestion for making misuse detection more effective is to write generic
detection signatures. This can be done by writing signatures that detect the effect
of the intrusion rather than detecting the use of a specific vulnerability. As shown
in [LP99], all types of buffer overflow attacks can potentially be caught with a
simple set of rules if they are made generic.
5.3.8 Efficient detection
Some papers indicate that their methods are efficient in their use of computing or
storage resources, and some even compare the efficiency of different realisations
of the method, e.g. [LB98]. This paper mentions short time to detection which
may be considered an efficiency aspect. However, there does not seem to be more
thorough studies on this subject.
5.3.9 Discussion and conclusions
The following is a summary and discussion of various possible research issues in
the area of detection method.
  Anomaly detection
  Misuse detection
  Visualisation
  Data reduction and manual detection
  Integration of methods
  New methods/improved methods
  Filtering analysis output
  Effective detection
  Efficient detection
  Detection with limited input
Many anomaly detection and misuse detection methods have been implemented
and tested. Of course there is always room for improvement and suggestions to
achieve more effective and efficient detection. The false alarm rate in particular is
still an unsolved problem.
Visualisation can be done in many ways, and only a few have been tried out
for intrusion detection. I believe that there is much more work to be done in this
area.
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Integration of methods should be an area of interest in today’s research. Many
papers suggest that combining anomaly and misuse detection can provide better
coverage and even say that the false alarm rate will be better. Very few papers
mention any details on how to do it, however, or what specific detection methods
to use. Detection in several layers is also an interesting method for achieving
more effective detection. Filtering analysis output and correlation of alarms may
also be an area to explore.
The discussion of how to carry out detection when the amount of information
that can be gathered in the system is limited. This may be the case when different
components in the computer system belong to different organisations or when
we wish to coordinate detection between completely separate computer systems.
I have not seen any research on this in the intrusion detection area.
5.4 Reporting and response
Every intrusion detection system needs to communicate with the outside world.
This may be done passively by notifying the SSO or actively by trying to hinder
the intruder or striking back. It is often not possible to use active response since
the IDSs generate too many false alarms and the response would hit innocent
users or hosts. The only possible action is then to report what has happened to
the SSO and perhaps provide him with the means to investigate the event further.
If anomaly detection is used, the SSO must be informed of the cause of an
alarm. This type of system often requires that the SSO makes an investigation
as it is not obvious what type of attack is being made when it is only known,
for example, that the number of false logins in the system have increased to an
abnormal level. It is not known whether it is an attack or simply a malfunction or
change of behaviour in the system.
Misuse detection makes it easier to describe the cause of the alarm to the SSO,
although this is still not obvious. One problem is that many different names exist
for the same attack and, even when there a name for the attack, the SSO may not
know what it is about or what to do about it. Another problem is that alarms must
be listed in some way, for example by urgency or according to the probabilty that
it is a true alarm.
Active response can be done in many ways, the most suitable way probably
depending on the situation. If availability is not very important, an easy solution
is just to shut services down or disconnect users. However, this is not always an
option for a business that is dependent on e-commerce. There are also legal and
ethical issues to consider.
A home user may find it easier to shut down a service if it is tampered with.
He has no possibility to study the output and make decisions about the response.
He is probably mostly interested in detecting a security incident, than responding
quickly to it. In a business system, availability can be important. However, it is
also important to preserve business secrets, and, here, a tradeoff must be made.
A military system probably has people who are dedicated to the security of the
computer system. They may study detection output in real-time and have a list
of advanced response options at hand.
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A classification of response functions in other IDSs is given in [CHSP00]. The
response function in a detection system can be categorised as a notification sys-
tem, manual response system, or automatic response system. According to these
authors, most systems today are notification systems.
5.4.1 Reporting
A PhD thesis on intrusion damage control and assessment is [Fis96] where it is
stated that the existing IDSs at that time all had the ability to generate reports
of suspicious activity but that the damage control and assessment capabilities
were minimal. He surveyed the reporting and response capabilites of about ten
different IDSs. The thesis was written in 1996, and it is obvious that much has
happened since then. Most of the systems only generate daily or weekly reports
of suspicious events or users. The only systems that had graphical user interfaces
that could alert the administrator in real-time (if he is present) were Haystack,
IDES, and ISOA. The user interfaces of these systems are not described in detail
here.
The thesis also described a new damage control and assessment system. The
focus of this system is not on the user interface for reporting and notifying the
SSO but instead relies on automatic response. It probably has some notification
capabilites, although these are not described in detail.
I have not found more recent work that focuses on the issue of how to report
to and alert the system administrator when suspicious activities occur. However,
most IDS papers describe the user interface in some detail.
Some examples of what is described in the research follow.
Swatch [Sma88] filters out “security relevant” events from the syslog log files
and can echo them to the Swatch controlling terminal. Particularly important
events can be mailed to the system administrator or cause Swatch to call his pager.
This interface is flexible but not very advanced.
NIDES [ALJ
 
94] has a better thought out interface that is graphical and has
menus and point-and-click selections. It presents information on monitored sys-
tems and summaries of system throughput and alert generation. It is also possible
to configure many parameters and monitoring options through the interface.
Most commercial systems have graphical interfaces. An alarm is often pre-
sented with a description of the presumed attack. However, they are generally
not very advanced.
5.4.2 Active response
Fisch’s PhD thesis [Fis96] surveys response mechanims, and only one of the IDSs
surveyed supports active response (ISOA). However, the response mechanisms
are not automatic and require the presence of an administration. The new re-
sponse system described in this thesis has an extensive set of active response
mechanisms. These include the following actions: suspend user jobs, terminate
user session, warn user, lock user account, create backup files, require additional
authentication, and employ shadow files.
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A taxonomy of intrusion response is proposed in [CP00]. The main elements
of this taxonomy are response timing, type of attack, type of attacker, strength of
suspicion, implications of the attack, and environmental constraints. The AAIRS
intrusion response system is described briefly here.
The components of AAIRS, which are based on intelligent agents, are de-
scribed in more detail in [CHSP00]. A classification of response functions in other
IDSs can also be found here. The response function in a detection system can
be categorised as a notification system, manual response system, or automatic
response system. They state that most systems are notification systems. The sys-
tems with automatic response are not very advanced, with two exceptions. The
Cooperating Security Managers (CSM) and Event Monitoring Enabling Respons-
es to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD) have some real-time response
adaption. Both use expert systems to determine an appropriate response based
on the current suspicion level. EMERALD also uses a severity metric to deter-
mine the appropriate response.
An adaptive intrusion detection system is described in [RCHP00]. This system
is used together with AAIRS to provide both adaptive detection and response.
The response system is relatively advanced. It keeps track of previous alarms and
classifies attacks on the basis of whether they are a continuation of an existing
incident or whether it is a new attack. Alarms from different IDS agents in the
system have different confidence metrics according to previous detection results.
The confidence in a suspected incident and the nature of the incident affects the
course of action taken. The response is also affected by a “policy specification
agent” to adapt the response to different constraints.
Active response capabilities of commercial IDSs are surveyed in [Jac99]. The
following types of active response are used in one or more of the surveyed sys-
tems.
  Session termination
  Router or switch reconfiguration
  Firewall reconfiguration
  Vulnerability correction
Session termination, router or switch reconfiguration, and firewall reconfigu-
ration are used in several systems. Vulnerability correction is used in only one
system. Other active responses suggested here are session hijacking and decep-
tion techniques, but these are not used in any of the systems surveyed.
5.4.3 Discussion and conclusions
The following is a summary and discussion of various possible research issues
within the Reporting and response area.
Passive response and human interaction issues:
  Presentation of detection data
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  What to expect from the SSO
Active response/countermeasure issues:
  Automatic response
  Support for manual response
Presentation of detection data is a very important part of an IDS. Many papers
on intrusion detection prototypes barely mention the user interface. Some things
that may be included in an alarm report are a summary and information about
the intrusion. Many different alarms can probably be connected to the same in-
trusion scenario. For example, it should be possible to trace an intruder from the
first probing of the system until he is inside and has root access. Graphical pre-
sentations of information can also help the SSO. Other issues are how to grade
alarms with respect to severity or urgency and how to present these different lev-
els. It should furthermore be possible to set probabilities on alarms, which may
make it easier for the SSO to manually filter out false alarms. I have not seen any
thorough work on the best way to present the output data of an IDS, and I think
that we need this.
Studies of what to expect from the SSO seem to be lacking. I believe that more
human interaction research in connection to intrusion detection may be needed.
One question is how to adapt the presentation of alarms to different administra-
tors with different amounts of time and knowledge.
It seems that the research community has begun to realise the importance of
active response in the last few years. Some work has been done in this area. How-
ever, until we can trust the output of the detection system, manual analysis of
the alarms is needed. This means that automatic response can be used only for
special incidents and must be defensive in nature. Support for manual response has
been implemented and may be useful when automatic response can not be used.
5.5 IDS environment and architecture
The idea of a distributed IDS has existed for a long time and today more or less all
IDSs are distributed. This definition of distributed means only that the IDS has
components that can be placed at different points in the computer network and
that these components can communicate in some way.
One type of distributed IDS only has data collection components distributed
in the network and makes all analyses at a central point. In another type, inde-
pendent data collection and analysis components are distributed in the network
and only a minimal management function is located at a central place. Everything
falling between these two types is of course also possible. Even when analysis is
centralised, the data collection components can use pre-filtering and formatting
of data before sending them to analysis. It is common for the central management
unit to present the alarms from all the distributed components. It may also corre-
late alarms and carry out system-wide detection of distributed attacks. A general
architecture of a distributed IDS is shown in figure 3.
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Figure 3: Distributed IDS
5.5.1 Distributed IDSs
DIDS [SSTG92] was one of the first distributed IDSs and has host and LAN mon-
itors that collect data and perform some pre-processing and analysis. The result-
ing information is sent to the DIDS director for further analysis and presentation
to the SSO. Several detection components have been used in the implementation
of the architecture, such as Haystack, a signature analysis component, and a sub-
set of NSM, which is a network IDS.
Mounji includes a chapter about the implementation of the distributed ver-
sion of ASAX in his thesis [Mou97]. He compares the performance of centralised
and distributed analysis and concludes that distributed analysis is more efficient.
However he did not discuss the best way to distribute analysis between the dis-
tributed and the central components. He also discussed some other issues in the
use of a distributed IDS. Some problems mentioned are clock synchronisation,
heterogeneous environment, scalability, and distributed intrusion patterns.
EMERALD [NP99] is one of the more modern distributed IDS architectures. It
is intended to be very general and to support interoperability and scalability. Each
EMERALD monitor is independent and may use input data from both raw data
sources and event reports from other detection components. The monitor consists
of a pluggable configuration library with connected profiler engines, signature
engines and a resolver that correlates alarms from the other components. It is
possible to plug in third-party modules for both detection and correlation. The
monitors can be used in a layered hierarchy, which gives it good scalability.
5.5.2 Agent-based IDSs
Another rather advanced IDS architecture is described by Spafford and Zamboni
[SZ00b]. They use what they call autonomous agents to do detection in a dis-
tributed computer network. In this architecture they use filters to deal with het-
erogeneous systems. One filter is used per data source, which provides the agents
with system independent input. More than one agent can “subscribe” to a filter.
The idea is that the agents should be reasonably small and dedicated to one task.
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Each host also has a transceiver that collects data from the agents, does the appro-
priate processing and sends it on to other agents or to a monitor that takes care
of system-wide analysis. They claim that the advantage of autonomous agents is
that it is possible to dynamically enable and disable them, which makes it pos-
sible to provide continuous monitoring. They can also be used in a hierarchical
structure, which makes the system scalable.
A system with lightweight, mobile agents is described by [HWHM00]. The
idea here is that the agents move around in a networked system between the
target hosts and collect information from local data cleaning agents.
A review of work on agents in intrusion detection and a thorough discussion
of its features and problems is given by Jansen et al. at NIST [JMKM99].
Another interesting use of mobile agents is described by Asaka et al. [ASAS99].
They treat the use of agents to trace an intruder along the intrusion route.
5.5.3 Detection in large-scale networks
An approach especially designed for detection in large networks is suggested
by Staniford-Chen et al. [SCCC
 
96]. Their detection prototype is called GrIDS
(Graph based Intrusion Detection System), since it aggregates information on ac-
tivity in the computer network into graphs. The approach is scalable and is espe-
cially good at detecting distributed attacks.
5.5.4 Discussion and conclusions
Here is given a summary and discussion of various possible research issues with-
in the IDS environment and architecture area.
  Distributed data collection and detection
  Correlation of alarms
  System-wide detection and correlation of alarms between networks
  Heterogenous systems
  How to deal with high-bandwidth and encrypted networks
  Scalability
  Mobile agents
  Security problems
Distributed data collection and detection have been treated in several papers.
What is missing is a thorough investigation of how much analysis should be done
in the distributed components and how much done centrally. Another interesting
issue is how to correlate alarms to detect distributed attacks.
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Dealing with heterogeneous systems has been discussed and some solutions sug-
gested. Scalability is discussed in many papers and seems to be a solvable prob-
lem. There may however be greater problems in making anomaly detection scale
well.
Concern has been expressed about how to deal with high-bandwidth and encrypted
networks, but I have not seen very much work in this area.
Agents, and especially mobile agents, have recently attracted the attention of
intrusion detection researchers. This is an interesting technology and may be the
solution used in the future. However, the area probably needs to become more
mature before we can tell whether it solves more problems than it creates.
Distributed IDSs add some security problems. These are discussed in section
5.6.
Distributed and modular IDSs are probably here to stay. A specially designed
IDS for an important application or service in a system may be needed in some
situations, but it is generally better when they are “pluggable” and part of a dis-
tributed IDS architecture. Most of the commercial systems today are distributed
and will remain so in the future.
5.6 IDS security
If the attacker is aware that an intrusion detection system exists, he will probably
start by studying the IDS to be able to shut it down, cripple it, or circumvent it.
The IDS will be the first point of attack, since the attacker can work undisturbed
when it is out of operation. He can be compared with a burglar who disables the
alarm system in a building before he starts his actual business.
Thus an IDS that can not resist attacks against itself is not of much use as a
security mechanism. It is stated in [HLJ01] that the IDS is not secure if it depends
upon other components that are insecure. For example, the input to the detection
system must be trusted, the operating system and hardware it is running on must
be trusted, and, if it is a distributed system, the communication links must also
be trusted.
A detection system is useless if its input is manipulated. Both the logging
mechanism and the log files must be protected to ensure the authenticity of the
input data. While deletion of log files makes it difficult to find out what hap-
pened, it is at least an evident sign of an attack. Modification or deletion of se-
lected entries in the log file are more tricky, since an attack can be covered up. In
this case, it is not even possible to know that something has happened.
It is also a security problem if an unauthorised person can read the log files.
These may contain information of help in mapping the behaviour of users to pre-
pare for a social engineering attack or to study the organisation of the system.
Log files also contain personal data that may be considered sensitive and should
be protected. Privacy problems associated with log data are discussed in [HLJ01]
and [SFHR97].
While a weak IDS may give a false sense of security, that is not the only prob-
lem. The IDS is also a valuable source of information to an attacker. This problem
is discussed in [HLJ01], where it is stated that the detection policy used by the
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IDS is extremely sensitive. If the exact detection rules are known by the attacker,
it is much easier to avoid detection. It is also a privacy problem if stored user
profiles are leaked, since they reveal a great deal of sensitive information about
people’s habits.
5.6.1 Protection of input data
One paper is prominent in the area of protecting log data. This is the work of
Schneier and Kelsey [SK99]. They suggest different solutions to the problem of
storing log files on an untrusted machine. They write that no security measures
can protect the log entries written after an attacker has gained control over the
computer. The solutions mentioned in this paper are:
  Write logs to “write once media”: printer, writable CDROM, WORM disk.
  Send log entries to a trusted log server. There must be a reliable, high-
bandwidth channel available.
  Encrypt the log files.
Schneier and Kelsey propose an interesting way of encrypting log files. The
log entries are encrypted in a “hash chain”, which makes it impossible to modify
or delete entries undetected. Furthermore, it is not possible to read the entries
without the correct encryption key. This seems to be a well-functioning technique
that would be possible to use in practice.
5.6.2 IDS resilience
Few papers discuss IDS resilience, i.e. the ability of the IDS to resist attacks
against itself. One of the few papers that does more than simply mention the
problem is [Pax98], which describes the Bro network IDS. A network IDS is a de-
tection system that uses only the traffic on the network to which it is attached as
input for analysis. A design goal in Bro is that the monitor should be able to re-
sist attacks. It is assumed that the attackers have full knowledge of the techniques
used by the monitor. However, the detection policy is assumed to be secret and
well protected.
Three types of attacks are considered in this paper:
  Overload attacks. These are attacks in which the monitor is overburdened
with traffic or suspicious events. The monitor can not keep up with the
data stream, starts dropping network packets, and may miss attacks. Bro
is designed to be lightweight and can keep up with a high traffic volume.
It is also suggested that the monitor be able to shed load when it is over-
whelmed, for example ceasing to capture packets from a specific protocol
according to a predefined policy. This would give some kind of graceful
degradation.
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  Crash attacks. A crash attack aims at taking the monitor completely out of
action. It may fail or run out of resources. Even single packets can have
this effect on a computer. Suggestions for defence are to test the monitor
carefully, to keep the system light weight so that it does not consume a great
deal of memory etc., to use a “watch dog” timer to see that a single packet
does not take to much time to process, and to have backup logging units.
  Subterfuge attacks. A subterfuge attack misleads the monitor as to the mean-
ing of the traffic it analyses. There are several ways to do this, such as by
sending fragmented IP packets. In Bro, defence is implemented against a
number of subterfuge attacks, but there is no general defence.
To our knowledge, this is the only paper that describes a IDS prototype with
an explicit design goal of being resilient.
A practical study of the resilience of four popular network IDSs is described in
[PN98]. The main problem identified and discussed in this paper is that a network
IDS has no way of knowing whether it interprets the captured network packets in
the same way as the target system (the same problem as in the subterfuge attacks
mentioned above). This makes it possible to evade detection in various ways.
It is possible to make the IDS accept packets that the target system rejects. The
opposite is also true - that it is possible to make the IDS reject packets that the
target system accepts. The reasons for these problems are that different operating
systems implement the packet processing differently and that there exist network
ambiguities. It is possible, for example, to set a short TTL (time to live) on a
packet that will make a router drop it before it reaches the target system (or the
IDS). Some network links will also use fragmentation to handle large packets,
which makes it possible to craft packets such that it reaches the target system in
one piece and reaches the IDS in fragment form.
The other problem discussed is that it is possible to make a “denial of service”
(DoS) attack against the IDS, which will leave the target system unprotected. This
can be done by exhausting the IDS’s resources, for example, CPU processing ca-
pabilities, low-level packet capture capabilities, memory used for TCP connection
state, or disk space used for log files.
The tests done in this paper show that all the systems examined had flaws of
the types described above. Some of the specific problems found would be easy to
fix while others had no obvious solution.
The commercial surveys show that the protection in commercial IDSs is either
non-existent or rather poor.
5.6.3 Security problems in distributed IDSs
The security implications in a distributed intrusion detection architecture is dis-
cussed in [HKJ99]. They state that a distributed IDS is more vulnerable than an
IDS where all functions are placed physically together, and and that it is impor-
tant both to protect the confidentiality of the data collected and of the detection
policy used in the analysis engines. The confidentiality of the data collected can
be protected by using a fully distributed IDS. In [HKJ01], it is described how to
protect distributed detection policies using one-way functions.
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5.6.4 Discussion and conclusions
Various possible research issues in the IDS security area are summarised and dis-
cussed below.
  Protection of log files
  Self-testing IDS
  Protection of distributed IDSs
Protection of log files and different aspects of protection of distributed IDSs have
been discussed and some solutions have been suggested. There is room for more
work within this area, however.
An interesting area is self-testing IDSs, but I have not yet seen very much work
on how to do it.
Most commercial systems are probably not concerned enough with the securi-
ty of the log files. However, if the IDS is distributed, they often encrypt the traffic
(including log data and alarms) sent between the components.
There are of course numerous other problems that should be addressed by
a resilient IDS. An example is dynamic learning systems that can be taught to
accept abnormal behaviour. Furthermore, if the attacker knows the threshold
values used in the system, he can decrease the rate of suspicious events to keep
it below the threshold. Another known way to immobilise the IDS is to make it
flood the system administrator with seemingly meaningless alarms in order to
make him switch it off. Finally, the attacker may also choose to do his business
quickly and run for it before the IDS or security personnel reacts. Part of the IDS
functionality is thus also the reaction time.
5.7 Testing and evaluation
This is the area of research on IDS testing and comparison. Some of the issues here
are how to create test data with the right properties, to find out what properties
should be measured, and to define what properties are important for different
types of target systems.
Intrusion detection researchers have recently become aware that testing and
evaluating IDSs is an areas that needs more work. It is difficult to create better
IDSs when we have no notion of what a good characteristic of an IDS is.
5.7.1 General testbeds and test data generation
Perhaps the greatest effort in testing and comparing intrusion detection systems
was made by DARPA [DAR01]. A paper that describes the experiments is [LFG
 
00].
A great deal of work has been done on generating large amounts of test and train-
ing data for this project. The generation of data is described, but details and anal-
ysis of its properties are lacking. The test data contain network traffic and system
call log files (SUN BSM log files) from a simulated large computer network. Both
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attacks and background data have been generated synthetically, but the back-
ground data are said to be similar to the sampling data from a number of Air
Force bases. The attacks are generated by running scripts taken from a database
of attacks and are described in [Ken99]. More detail about the generation of ses-
sions and the technique used to scale up data is given in [DCW
 
99].
McHugh [McH00] criticises the lack of validation of test data in the DARPA
evaluation. The process of generating data is vaguely described, and it is difficult
to determine the quality of the data. There are no guarantees that the attacks used
are in fact representative and realistic. He also questions whether the background
data are actually representative of the user behaviour in the computer systems
used and whether the behaviour in these systems represents user behaviour in
other computer systems. Another question he raises is whether attacks are realis-
tically distributed in the background data.
Debar et al. [DDWL98] developed a generic intrusion detection testbed. They
showed how to simulate user behaviour with a finite state automata to obtain
normal traffic, but stated that this is only a practical approach if the set of user
commands is limited. Instead, they carried out experiments with recorded live
data that were replayed inside the workbench. They also describe how they create
attack scripts to be used in the testing process.
Chung et al. [CPOM95] claim that concurrent and distributed intrusions are
likely to occur in a computer system and therefore should be included in the
test data for intrusion detection systems. They developed a tool that parallelises
attack scripts to simulate concurrent intrusions.
Puketza et al. [PZC
 
96] described a software platform for testing intrusion
detection systems. They used the expect UNIX package to generate synthetic user
sessions. However, they did not analyse the quality of these data to any great
extent.
An effort to produce high quality test data is made by [LKJ01]. The data are
synthetic and were generated to test a fraud detection system. However, the au-
thors believe that the method may also be useful for intrusion detection. This
paper also thoroughly discusses important properties of test data.
5.7.2 Testing special properties
Maxion and Tan [MT00] discuss the effects of more or less irregular background
data. They generate “random” background data with different degrees of regu-
larity and show that they drastically affect the false alarm rate. The paper also
measures regularity in real-world log data.
5.7.3 Discussion and conclusions
The following is a summary and discussion of various possible research issues in
the area of testing and evaluation.
  IDS quality measures
  Measuring detection rate
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  Measuring false alarm rate
  Efficiency testing
  Test data generation
  Intrusion injection
Some work has been done on testing IDSs, but a great deal more must be
done to make it easier and more accurate. In particular, IDS quality measures are
missing. Since it is difficult to retrieve authentic data with the right properties
for intrusion detection testing, we need to develop better methods for test data
generation and realistic intrusion injection. A conclusion is that all aspects of testing
need more work.
5.8 Operational aspects
Operational aspects are about the technical issues important to customers using
IDSs. They include maintenance, portability, and upgradability. Such issues as
interoperability between IDSs or IDS components are also important, as is the
knowledge required to configure and operate the IDS. These are very important
issues in terms of making IDSs useful on the commercial market.
The work on EMERALD [NP99] brings up these questions, where the design
goal is to make EMERALD generic and easy to upgrade. The work on using
agents for intrusion detection (see section 5.5.2) mentions that this method makes
the IDS more portable and easier to maintain during runtime. Studies on require-
ments of the person operating the IDS are still lacking but would give valuable
information.
In [ACF
 
00], which describes the state of the practice of intrusion detection
technologies, recommendations are given to ID sponsors, users, vendors, and
researchers. They describe what they call organisational issues, which are rec-
ommendations about, for example, deployment, operation and use, and main-
tenance. A deployment issue is to install and configure the IDS to reflect the
security policy. An example of an issue of operation and use is the allocation of
roles and responsibilities for analysing the results that an IDS produces and act-
ing on those results. Maintenance issues are updating the signature database and
replacing the old version of the IDS with a new version.
An issue of interest is finding efficient ways of creating and adding new pat-
terns to look for in misuse detection systems. This has of course been discussed
in papers on misuse detection, but I have not seen any general solutions to the
problem.
Automatic system tuning would also be interesting. Both anomaly and misuse
detection systems need a great deal of parameter tuning when installed in a new
system. Ways to do this more automatically would be useful.
There is not a great deal of work that focuses on these issues. These issues may
often not be considered research issues, but perhaps there will be more interest in
operational aspects in the future.
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5.9 Social aspects
Some ethical and legal issues may be obstacles to the spreading of IDSs. The pri-
mary issues discussed so far in public research are privacy issues and questions
about how to make the output of IDSs usable as forensic evidence.
5.9.1 Privacy
A thorough discussion is given in [SFHR97] on laws concerning privacy and on
motivation for why privacy enhancing techniques should be used in IDSs. They
claim that use of IDSs may not be permitted in some countries if privacy is not
protected.
Techniques for anonymisation or pseudonymisation of log files are found e.g.
in [SFHR97] and [LJ99]. These papers do not address the problem of a subverted
log server. We can assume that a trusted log server is used here. However, even if
log data are collected and stored in a secure fashion, they may still end up in the
wrong hands. The log data may be used in other contexts and handled by people
with no need to know everything about the users and computers in the system.
People may be interested in the information in the log files for security analysis
etc., but have no need to know the real names of the users and the IP addresses
of the computers in the log files.
5.9.2 Forensics
The use of detection output as evidence of computer crime has been discussed in
some work.
Stephenson [Ste00] describes the framework of a project that aims at exploring
the applicability of intrusion detection systems to evidence collection and man-
agement. He states that a requirement in a forensic system is “the maintenance
of a chain of custody whereby all evidence can be accounted for and its integrity
attested from the time of its collection to the time of its use in a legal proceeding”.
A concern is whether the IDS can perform its primary mission effectively at the
same time that it handles the capturing and management of forensic evidence.
Schneier and Kelsey [SK99] claim that the primary benefit of their tamper-
proof encrypted audit logs is that they aid forensic analysis. The encryption
scheme makes it possible to identify which part of the log is valid and which
part that may be tampered with, which is an important feature if it is to be used
as forensic evidence.
5.9.3 Discussion and conclusions
Some work has been done on both privacy and legal aspects. It seems that interest
in privacy enhancing techniques is not at a high right now but it may be neces-
sary to address these aspects in the future if privacy legislation becomes more
stringent. Privacy enhancing techniques may also prove useful in some special
applications, such as third-party analysis of log files and detection output, which
is relatively common today.
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Not much has been done on legal aspects. I believe that forensic management
capabilities in IDSs will be more common when the intrusion detection area ma-
tures.
More social aspects of intrusion detection may surface, but these are the only
areas in which I have found work at this time.
6 Research trends
As we can see in this survey, a huge amount of research has been done in the
area of intrusion detection. Efforts are not always well organised, however, and,
while some areas receive a great deal of attention, other are almost completely
neglected.
Hot areas right now are agent-based IDSs and the development of testbeds.
Other areas that have recently received some attention are active response and
the security of IDSs. Many people also mention other important areas with un-
resolved issues, but many of these have been known for a long time without any
effort being made to work on them and find solutions.
In my opinion, the most important remaining research issues are the follow-
ing.
Classification of intrusions. A reason why we do not know what data to collect
and use as input for IDSs is that we do not have a systematic approach to-
ward identifying what data are needed to detect specific intrusions or class-
es of intrusions. We must have a classification of IDSs that is based on the
traceability or characteristics important in the detection process. Some ini-
tial work in this area has been done, but more is needed.
Effective data collection. So far, most projects have used easily available data
sources. Many comment that these sources are not really suitable for intru-
sion detection. We need to find out in detail what data are necessary for
detection and develop new mechanisms to collect them in an efficient way.
Reporting of alarms. We need an intuitive and informative user interface that
allows the SSO to explore the computer system. Such an interface does not
exist today. I believe that this may be one of the most neglected issues, since
it is very important for the understanding of security issues in a computer
system.
Methodology for test data generation. Testing and comparing IDSs is important
to the progress of the area. The greatest obstacle here is the difficulty of
generating suitable test data. The process of generating test data must be
easier and more automated, to make it feasible to test and evaluate different
aspects of IDSs.
Our view of intrusion detection is that it is not just a fad that will disappear.
However, it may experience some change in its shape and functions. A fear is that
future intrusion detection systems will just work as anti-virus software. There is
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a potential to do much more with an IDS than merely have it detect pre-defined
patterns of well known attacks. An intrusion detection system can create a picture
of the computer system behaviour and give the system administrator an entirely
new opportunity to learn his system and become familiar with its behaviour. This
may pave the way for a better understanding of security and intrusion manage-
ment.
7 Conclusions and future work
There are still many aspects of intrusion detection that require more research to
make IDSs effective and usable. The area is still immature, despite the extensive
research efforts made and the enormous amount of money that has been spent.
A hope is that this collection of research efforts and presentation of areas and
open research issues may inspire people doing research in intrusion detection.
Efforts can be concentrated to the right areas and research ideas can be brought
to the commercial market to a greater extent.
We plan to extend this work to include research in fraud detection. It is sug-
gested in [KLJ00] that the areas of intrusion detection and fraud detection have
quite a lot to learn from each other. Some fraud papers have been included in this
survey, and methods used there are in many cases applicable to intrusion detec-
tion. A similar research survey of the fraud detection area may offer many ideas
on common interests and facilitate an exchange of ideas.
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